The Effects of Convergence and Divergence Alliance Portfolio on Firm Performance by Sukoco, Badri Munir
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 21(2), 2016                              ISSN: 1083-4346 
The Effects of Convergence and Divergence 
Alliance Portfolio on Firm Performance 
 
 
Badri Munir Sukoco 
Department of Management 
Airlangga University, Surabaya, Indonesia 60286 
badri@feb.unair.ac.id 
 
 
ABSTRACT 
 
This study emphasizes the relationship between domain learning in an alliance 
portfolio – convergence and divergence - and firm performance. Inter-organizational 
dependency is argued as the moderator for this relationship. This study empirically tests 
the developed hypotheses on the S&P 500 firms from 2000 to 2007. The results 
indicate that domain learning is positively associated with firm performance. Further 
results indicate that the nature of interdependencies between a firm and its partners in 
an alliance portfolio moderates this relationship, and specifically that a firm will 
generate better performance when it is less dependent on its partners. The above 
findings have important implications both for academics and professional alliance 
portfolio managers. 
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I.  INTRODUCTION 
 
More than eighty percent of Fortune 1000 CEOs in 2007-2008 agreed that 26% of their 
companies’ revenues were associated with their alliance portfolios, as reported by 
Partner Alliances (Kale, Singh, and Bell, 2009). An alliance portfolio is a firm’s 
collection of direct alliances with partners (Hoffmann, 2007; Lavie, 2007; Lavie and 
Miller, 2008), and such collections increased on average from four to 30 alliances 
during the 1990s (Lavie, 2007). In trying to determine performance effects, previous 
studies have focused extensively on the configuration of alliance portfolios. For 
example, types of alliance learning activities (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Lin, Yang, 
and Demirkan, 2007), types of capabilities on managing portfolio (e.g., Sarkar, Aulakh, 
and Madhok, 2009; Schreiner, Kale, and Corsten, 2009), alliance portfolio 
configurations (e.g., Andrevski, Brass, and Ferrier, 2014; Wuyts and Dutta, 2012), 
partners’ country of origin (Lavie and Miller, 2008), types of governance mechanisms 
(e.g., Heimeriks, Duysters, and Vanhaverbeke, 2007; Hoetker and Mellewigt, 2009), 
types of legitimacy (e.g., Baum, Calabrese, and Silverman, 2000; Stuart, 2000), number 
of alliances and partners (e.g., Ahuja, 2000), types of networks (e.g., Gulati, 1998; 
Powell, Koput, and Smith-Doerr, 1996), and types of resources (e.g., Lavie, 2007; Luo 
and Deng, 2009) from an alliance portfolio have been related to firm outcomes.  
This study focuses on how learning in an alliance portfolio contributes to firm 
performance. Interorganizational learning enables a firm to access new knowledge 
residing outside the firm’s boundaries and collaboratively leverage existing knowledge 
with partners (e.g., Sukoco, 2015; Yamakawa, Yang, and Lin, 2011). Previous studies 
approach alliance learning from the function, structure, and other peripheral attributes 
involved in the alliance (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006; Lin et al., 2007), or consider 
process-based learning inside the alliance (Heimeriks et al., 2007; Schreiner et al., 2009) 
and how it relates to firm performance. Despite the rapid progress in this research 
stream, previous studies mostly undermines the fact that a firm may also learn by 
forming an alliance that is different from its core business. 
Prior studies (Mowery, Oxley, and Silverman, 1996; Nakamura, Shaver, and 
Yeung, 1996) report that converging or diverging resources and capabilities toward 
partners imply interfirm knowledge transfer inside alliances.  However, these studies 
address the issue mainly from the overlap of technological capabilities of the allied 
firms. In contrast, this study addresses the question of whether or not configuring an 
alliance portfolio within-domain leads to better firm performance relative to across-
domain configurations. Based on organizational learning theory, this study proposes 
that domain learning in alliance portfolio consists of divergence and convergence 
modes (Sukoco, 2015). The divergence learning mode refers to a firm that configures 
its alliance portfolio further away from its industry domain, thereby facilitating 
experimentation in capabilities and knowledge in different domains (March, 1991). On 
the other hand, when the focal firm configures their alliance portfolio close to its own 
business – the convergence learning mode – the firm facilitates the use of existing 
capabilities and knowledge (Levinthal and March, 1993). This study further argues why 
these two learning activities produce varying levels of firm performance.  
Although learning activities are crucial for firm performance, this study also 
investigates under what conditions these activities deliver higher or lower firm 
performance. The nature of the relationships – interdependencies (Pfeffer and Salancik, 
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1978) between a focal firm and its partners in the portfolio could also magnify the 
relationship between alliance learning and firm performance. Configuring an alliance 
portfolio with partners that are more vs. less dependent compared to those that are 
equally dependent on a focal firm could produce different effects on firm performance 
(e.g., Vandaie and Zaheer, 2014, Ozmel and Guler, 2014).  
The contributions of this study are as follows: First, this study introduces the 
concept of convergence/divergence learning modes as an extension of the 
exploitation/exploration concept of March (1991), which is largely ignored in the 
alliance literature and therefore lacks sufficient empirical testing for viability. Second, 
this study extends the RBV (Barney, 1991; Lavie, 2006) to organizational learning 
(Levinthal and March, 1993) by relating a firm’s resources with its alliance portfolio. 
Finally, this study extends the resource dependence theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) 
by asserting that differential dependencies have different effects on the relationship 
between alliance learning and firm performance.  
 
II.   THEORETICAL BACKGROUND 
 
A. Alliance Learning 
 
Scholars have proposed different conceptions of how to learn in a strategic alliance, but 
the essence of the learning process itself is mostly rooted in the dichotomy of 
exploitation and exploration (March, 1991), which is also adopted in this study. The 
exploration-exploitation framework distinguishes two broad patterns of learning 
behavior. March defined them as follows: “Exploration includes things captured by 
terms such as search, variation, risk taking, experimentation, play, flexibility, discovery, 
and innovation. Exploitation includes such things as “refinement, choice, production, 
efficiency, selection, implementation, and execution” (1991: 71). Levinthal and March 
added that exploration involves “a pursuit of new knowledge,” whereas exploitation 
involves “the use and development of things already known” (1993: 105). To 
operationalize this dichotomy, prior alliance studies categorize it into three distinct 
forms (Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006): function-based, which mainly looks at the content 
of alliance formation (e.g., Anand and Khanna, 2000; Lin et al., 2007); structure-based, 
which looks at the positions of a firm’s partners in a broader network (e.g., Powell et al., 
1996; Ahuja, 2000), and an attribute-based dimension (e.g., Dussauge, Garrette, and 
Mitchell, 2000; Luo and Deng, 2009). 
In addition, the focal firm’s decision to form an alliance, either within- or across-
domain, also involves learning processes that are critical to firm performance. This 
study defines domain learning as representing the learning processes by forming an 
alliance which is close to or further away from a firm’s business domain. Additionally, 
exploration is defined as the extent to which the focal firm composes their alliance 
portfolio further away from their own domain, which is termed divergence learning. 
Exploitation refers to the extent to which a focal firm configures their alliance portfolio 
closer to its own domain, and is termed convergence learning. Divergence learning 
enables a focal firm to discover new opportunities and build new competencies (Koza 
and Lewin, 1998) by composing an alliance portfolio in different industries. 
Convergence learning enables a focal firm to leverage existing capabilities and join 
existing competencies (Rothaermel and Deeds, 2004) with their partners in the industry 
where they operate. This definition is consistent with previous operationalization, such 
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as search scope – in which a focal firm explores new knowledge, and search depth – in 
which a focal firm reuses their existing knowledge (Katila and Ahuja, 2002), and 
knowledge generation and knowledge application (Spender, 1992), among others. 
Moreover, this study regards convergence and divergence as two ends of the same 
continuum, because of the incompatibility of both with respect to a firm’s scarce 
resources and different types of capabilities and knowledge to execute (March, 1991).  
The resource-based theory posits that a firm accesses other firm’s critical 
resources by establishing a strategic alliance (Das and Teng, 2000; Lavie, 2006) and 
creating value by pursuing the potential synergy between both partners (Wang and 
Zajac, 2007). When the alliance is in the same industry as the focal firm, the duplication 
of resources and capabilities are in place, facilitating the use of existing knowledge 
(Levinthal and March, 1993), engaging in refinement processes (March, 1991), and 
pursuing greater efficiency (Dussauge et al., 2000). Moreover, the use of the 
convergence learning mode decreases the information asymmetry between a focal firm 
and their alliance portfolio due to similar usage of resources and capabilities 
(Mitsuhashi and Greve, 2009), and thus, convergence learning contributes to firm 
performance.  
Similarly, the configuration of alliance portfolio which is different from the core 
business of the focal firm also has a positive relationship with firm performance. Even 
though new areas increase the problem of information asymmetry (Balakrishnan and 
Koza, 1993), the benefits of the divergence learning mode offset it. For example, 
configuring an alliance portfolio across different industries increases the prospects of 
new value creation due to access to diverse information and capabilities (Baum et al., 
2000; Dussauge et al., 2000). Moreover, the divergence learning mode enables the 
discovery of new opportunities (new markets) and the building of new competencies 
that will facilitate the focal firm’s adaptation to a changing environment (Koza and 
Lewin, 1998) and increase market performance (Sarkar, Echambadi, and Harrison, 
2001). As a result, the divergence learning mode in an alliance portfolio is also 
positively associated with firm performance. Therefore,  
 
H1: There will be a positive relationship between domain learning and firm 
performance. 
 
As defined by Pfeffer and Salancik (1978), interdependencies between two 
organizations exist when one party’s interests cannot be achieved without the other 
party’s resources, and when an alliance is necessary to achieve the desired goals. The 
concept of interdependence has received considerable attention from scholars studying 
interorganizational relations. Much of the early research on organizations considered 
interdependence between actors to be a liability that needed to be managed (e.g., Pfeffer 
and Nowak, 1976), because unequal dependence would cause power imbalances and 
likely be detrimental for the weaker actor (e.g., Dyer, Singh, and Kale, 2008; 
Thompson, 1967).  
Many studies propose that constraint absorption among interdependent actors 
has been grounded in the interrelated notions of power (e.g., Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005, Gulati and Sytch, 2007). The concept of interdependence with power is closely 
linked to the theory of power-dependence relations (Emerson, 1962). Prior studies 
suggest that the power resides in the availability of alternative sources (e.g., Brass, 
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1984; Kumar, Scheer, and Steenkamp, 1998), the concentration of exchange (e.g., Burt, 
1982; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), or the social status of the exchange parties (e.g., 
Lin, Yang, and Arya, 2009; Stuart, 2000). The theory further posits that there are two 
types of interdependencies, dependence asymmetry and balance dependence (Emerson, 
1962). Dependence asymmetry refers to the power differences between one party and 
the other, or the difference between two parties’ dependencies (Casciaro and Piskorski, 
2005; Gulati and Sytch, 2007), in which a focal firm could be more or less dependent 
on its partners in the alliance portfolio. Balance dependency refers to the situation with 
equal dependencies between the focal firm and its partners in the alliance portfolio.  
This study posits that the nature of the relationship between a focal firm and its 
partners in an alliance portfolio, either balance or asymmetric, moderates the 
relationship between domain learning and firm performance. Specifically, when the 
focal firm is less dependent on its partners, it can appropriate greater private benefits 
from the alliance due to its relatively greater power (Dyer et al., 2008). Even though the 
convergence learning mode generally has a modest positive relationship with firm 
performance, the similar bases of resources between a focal firm and their alliance 
portfolio enables them to assess and appropriate private benefits as well as with the use 
of the divergence learning mode. Consequently, a less dependent firm tends to accrue 
greater firm performance than with any other conditions of interdependency. On the 
other hand, a highly dependent firm has low bargaining power relative to its stronger 
partners, and thus has less ability to appropriate private benefits from the alliance. The 
capability to appropriate private benefits is even smaller when the configuration of an 
alliance portfolio is dominated by the convergence learning mode, which is due to the 
awareness by the firm of its weaker position. On the other hand, the use of the 
divergence learning mode could offset a firm’s dependency on a stronger partner by 
enriching alternative sources of power (e.g., Brass, 1984; Kumar et al., 1998) or 
distributing an exchange concentration (e.g., Burt, 1982; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). 
Consequently, a highly dependent firm would receive better payoffs when it employs 
the divergence learning mode. For example, Stuart (2000) reported that young and 
small firms benefit more when they diversify and ally with stronger ones. Similarly, 
Kim, Hoskisson, and Wan (2004) reported that weaker keiretsu member firms increase 
their ROA when they broaden their business spectrum. In summary, asymmetry 
dependencies lead to greater competition than cooperation in an alliance by focusing 
more on enlarging private benefits (Khanna, 1998; Khanna, Gulati, and Nohria, 1998), 
and greater benefits (firm performance) accrue to less dependent firms.  
In a balance dependent condition, the creation of common benefits will be 
facilitated by the greater cooperation between a focal firm and its partners (Khanna, 
1998; Khanna et al., 1998). Equal dependencies also influence the distribution of 
common benefits, in which each party appropriates proportional value from the alliance 
(Dyer et al., 2008), based on their contributed resources. Consequently, firm 
performance for the balance dependent condition will be in between that for the less 
and highly dependent conditions, for both convergence and divergence learning modes. 
Therefore,  
 
H2: Interdependencies will interact with domain learning such that for a focal firm that 
dominantly configures an alliance portfolio with convergence learning, less dependency 
on partners will generate greater firm performance than any other condition.  
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III.  RESEARCH METHOD 
 
A. Empirical Setting 
 
The sample companies are firms that are in high and low velocity industries (Fine, 1998) 
and which were listed on the S&P 500 from 2000-2007. This study includes these firms 
in order to examine the effects of within- and across-industry alliances, as prior studies 
mainly emphasize a single industry, such as biotechnology firms (e.g., George, Zahra, 
et al., 2001; Luo and Deng, 2009), the computer software industry (Lavie, 2007; Lavie 
and Miller, 2008; Lavie and Rosenkopf, 2006), semiconductors (Stuart, 2000), or the 
steel industry (Koka and Prescott, 2008). By employing these data sets, this study can 
approximate the interdependencies of these firms with their partners. Moreover, the 
alliance portfolios formed and managed by these large companies are critical for 
sustaining daily economic life (Perrow, 1986), and their strategic behaviors have 
considerable legitimacy, which inspires others to conform to them (DiMaggio and 
Powell, 1983; Dacin, Oliver, Roy, 2007). These firms are also active in investing large 
amounts of capital in managing their alliance portfolios, and the data related to their 
alliance activities is readily available in press releases from various sources. In addition, 
the sample is highly representative, since these 500 firms consistently accounted for 
about 11.40% of the market capitalization of the firms listed on the New York Stock 
Exchange (NYSE) from 2000-2007. Figure 1 presents the research model of this study.  
 
 
Figure 1 
Proposed framework 
 
Control variables:  
 
- Firm level: relative sales and relative size 
- Portfolio level: portfolio size, multi-partner 
alliance, portfolio internationalization, joint 
ventures, ownership, and ties multiplicity. 
- Industry level: popularity of alliances, market 
uncertainty, and year  
H1 
 
Domain learning of 
alliance portfolio 
 
Local firm 
performance 
Moderator:  
Interdependencies 
H2 
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B. Sample and Data 
 
This study includes only those S&P 500 firms with at least 70 percent business in one 
sector. Diversified firms are excluded because the strategic consideration of the 
resource combination of these firms is considerably more complex and more likely to 
be at the business level rather than the corporate one (Wang and Zajac, 2007). Since 
this study focuses at the corporate level, it is desirable to focus on those firms with one 
dominant business. If a firm is acquired or went out of the S&P 500 list during the 
sampling period (2000 – 2007), it is dropped out of the sample in the following year. 
This study selects this period because of the so-called alliance wave of 2000, 
when companies significantly increased their numbers of alliance partner (Lavie, 2007). 
Moreover, as prior studies mainly used the data prior to the year 2000, they lack the 
recency that this study can provide. This time also allows this study a reasonably long 
period for studying these activities, while also having a five-year period to control for 
the history of the alliance activities of these firms. All alliance activities conducted by 
these firms from 1995 to 2007 are collected from the SDC Platinum Database. Any 
ambiguities are resolved by consulting alternative sources, such as Lexis/Nexis and 
corporate web sites. The dates of the announcements of alliance formations are used to 
record the occurrence of these events. Firm-specific financial data were collected from 
COMPUSTAT.  
Following the procedure used by Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), which wass 
inspired by Burt (1982, 1983), this study operationalizes the notion of dependence 
between firms in different industries based on input-output patterns of transactions 
across economic sectors. The data is generated from the Benchmark Input-Output (I-O) 
accounts for the U.S. economy developed by the Bureau of Economic Analysis (BEA) 
which is released every five years. Moreover, this study matches the four digits of the 
Standard Industrial Classification (SIC) codes which are used in SDC with six-digit I-O 
codes from BEA. This study identifies the four largest firms in each sector, sums their 
sales, and divides the sum by the total volumes of sales for the sector reported in the 
input-output table (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). To obtain annual measures of 
exchanges between industries for the period 2000-2007, this study linearly extrapolates 
the measures over the three available accounts for 1997, 2002, and 2007. In addition, 
there are not any significant effects on annual measures or the regression results due to 
the slight changes over any five-year period (Burt, 1983). 
 
C. Measures 
 
Dependent variables: Market-based performance. Compared to other variables, such as 
return on sales or Tobin’s q, market-based performance has stronger explanatory power 
(Lavie, 2007). The measurement captures the annual change in a firm’s common share 
market value, and calculated by averaging the 12 end-of-month daily values due to the 
high volatility. Further, this study adjusts the measure by dividing the ratio of the 
compound S&P 500 market value at year t to the compound S&P 500 market value (in 
millions of US dollars) at the base year to control stock market fluctuations and 
temporal trends. The following is the adjusted market value of firm i’s common shares 
at time t+1 (Lavie, 2007):  
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This study calculates the annual change in market value by dividing the adjusted 
market value at year t+1 by the adjusted market value at year t in order to control for 
past performance and enable the interpretation of causal effects of the independent 
variables. Moreover, in order to produce efficient and unbiased estimation, this study 
log-transforms this ratio to generate the change in market value (Lavie, 2007; Stuart, 
2000), as follows:  
 
ln(Market valuei,t+1) = α ln(Market valuei,t) + π’xi,t + ei,t+1           (2) 
 
where xi,t is a covariate matrix. All variables are annually updated and lagged by one 
year relative to the dependent variable.  
Independent variable: Domain learning. This study employs Standard Industrial 
Classification (SIC) codes. Even though the SIC approach has some limitations (Robins 
and Wiersema, 1995), it is considered an effective way to map out the relatedness 
between firms (e.g., Villalonga and McGahan, 2005). This study sets divergence 
learning as when all four digits of the SIC code between the allying firms are dissimilar 
to the focal firm’s SIC code and gives a categorical 1, 0.75 if the first digit of the SIC 
code between the focal firm and its partners is the same, 0.5 if the first two digits of the 
focal firm and alliance firm are the same, 0.25 if the alliance partners share the first 
three digits, and 0 if all four SIC codes are identical. High values indicate divergence, 
whereas low values indicate convergence learning mode.  
Moderating variable: Interdependency is measured following Casciaro and 
Piskorski (2005), which is based on the economic exchange (I-O accounts) of inter-
industry flows. zij, expressed as the total dollar value of goods and services sold by 
industry i to industry j. Subsequently, dependence of industry i on industry j, which is 
high to the extent that industry i sells a significant proportion of its goods and services 
to industry j, sij, or it buys a significant proportion of its goods and services from 
industry j, pij. To convert the measure of the interdependencies of industry i on industry 
j, this study multiplies the dependence measure by four-firm concentration ratios in 
industry j, Rj. Therefore, the measure of dependence of firms in industry i on firms in 
industry j, as Ej→i (Burt, 1983):  
jijijij R)sp(E  , where 
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According to Pfeffer (1987), interdependencies should be based on across- rather 
than within-industry alliances. The above measures consistently support this notion that 
the use of industry-level data has sounder theoretical bases than the use of firm-to-firm 
transactions (Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005). When the unit of analysis is shifted to a 
dyad of business units in industries i and j, the dyad can be characterized by two 
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constraint measures Ej→i and Ei→j, defined as: ijijiji R)sp(E  . The bi-directional 
nature of the measurement implies that the constraint values of a business unit in 
industry i on a business unit in industry j or vice versa might not be the same. Further, 
this study constructs a dyadic measure of interdependencies between business units in 
industry i and business units in industry j as follows: 
jiijji EEdenciesInterdepen   . The dependencies of industry i on their partners 
in an alliance portfolio will be:  


n
1t
jkmiijkmji EEdenciesInterdepen , where n 
refers to the number of partners related to a firm in industry i, j refers to partners of a 
firm in industry i, k refers to partners related to a firm in industry i, m refers to each 
partner of the firm, and t refers to the year of the alliance being formed. Differing from 
Casciaro and Piskorski (2005), this study regards the value of zero as representing 
mutual dependence between partners and this is coded as zero (0), negative value 
indicates that a focal firm is less dependent on partners and is coded as minus one (-1), 
and a positive value shows that a focal firm is highly dependent on partners and this is 
coded as positive one (1). 
Control Variables. Even though this study has been controlled for inter-temporal 
trends and shocks by standardizing the dependent variable by the S&P 500 stock 
market index, some variables might confound the expected results. Therefore, this study 
controls fourteen variables that are categorized into firm-, portfolio-, and industry-level. 
The details are as follows:  
Firm-level: First, relative size has been found to be a significant factor that 
affects alliance formation and performance (Gulati, 1998). As suggested by Wang and 
Zajac (2007), the relative size of the focal firm with their partners could predict alliance 
performance. A large firm tends to have greater probability of success in managing 
their alliance portfolio, because their available resources facilitate this (Lavie, 2007). 
This study controls the relative size of a focal firm by taking a natural log of their total 
assets divided by the industry’s total assets. Second, the industry concentration index of 
firms may affect a focal firm’s power to exchange with others. Resource dependence 
theory (Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978) argues that firms with more power tend to generate 
greater benefits in inter-organizational relationships. To calculate the industry 
concentration index for each firm, this study uses COMPUSTAT sales data from 2000 
through 2007. Each industry’s concentration index for each year is calculated by 
following Wang and Zajac (2007), as follows: )S/S( 22i , where S is the total sales of 
all firms in one specific industry defined by two-digit NAICS code, and Si  is the sales 
of firm i.  
Portfolio-level: First, functional learning could influence firm performance (Lin 
et al., 2007). Following Lavie and Rosenkopf (2006), this study codes a categorical 
indicator of whether each alliance involved a knowledge generating R&D agreement 
(coded 1); an agreement based on existing knowledge involving joint marketing and 
service, OEM/VAR, licensing, production, or supply (coded 0); or a combination of 
R&D and other agreements (coded 0.5). Second, portfolio size may positively affect 
firm performance (Ahuja, 2000; Baum et al., 2000; Stuart et al., 1999), and is measured 
by dividing the total number of alliances of a focal firm in a given year by its total 
assets. Third, societal-status of partners is measured as the social status of partners 
INTERNATIONAL JOURNAL OF BUSINESS, 21(2), 2016                                                    121 
 
 
(based on S&P 500 and Fortune 500 lists) in the alliance portfolio with regard to the 
focal firm, which might also influence firm performance (Lin et al., 2009). This study 
codes as one (1) when the focal firm has high status and zero (0) when the firm status is 
balanced. There is no low social status for the sample of this study. Fourth, multi-
partner alliance is measured by the average number of partners involved in each of the 
firm’s alliances, assuming that multi-partner alliances entail more complex 
management (Lavie, 2007). Fifth, tie multiplicity is controlled for another relational 
aspects by measuring the number of sequential partnerships held by a focal firm and a 
particular firm and uses a five-year window (Ahuja, 2000), in which repeated partners 
are coded as one (1) and first-time partners as zero (0). Sixth, portfolio 
internationalization is measured by the percentage of foreign partners in the alliance 
portfolio, assuming that high proportions of foreign partners may be more difficult to 
manage because of geographical and cultural distance (Lavie and Miller, 2008), in 
which foreign partners are coded as one (1) and domestic partners are coded as zero (0).  
Seventh, location refers to the notion of where the alliances are operated relative to 
domestic ones, whereby USA located  alliances are coded as zero (0) and non-USA 
alliances are coded as one (1). Eighth, joint venture is measured by the proportion of 
equity-based joint ventures out of the total number of alliances in the firm’s portfolio, 
with JV coded as one (1) and non-JV coded as zero (0), in order to control for the 
governance mode of alliances (Lavie, 2007).  Finally, ownership is measured by the 
equity contribution that a focal firm committed to a particular alliance (Reuer and 
Ragozzino, 2006).  
Industry-level: First, market uncertainty is measured by the volatility of net sales 
of firms in the focal industry (Lin et al., 2007), which is operationalized by dividing the 
standard deviation of net sales of firms in the focal industry with the industry’s average. 
Second, it is possible that firms choose to engage in alliances because other firms in the 
same industry are doing so (Wang and Zajac, 2007). This study measures popularity of 
alliances in the industry to which each firm belongs by dividing the actual number of 
alliances in a focal firm’s portfolio by the total number of alliances in the industry. 
Finally, year is controlled for any time-specific variations and consists of seven dummy 
variables for each year (using year 2000 as a base). All the research variables are 
presented in Table 1.  
 
D. Descriptive  
 
Following Anand and Khanna (2000), this study compiles records of alliances formed 
by each focal firm in the S&P 500 from 1995 to 2007 from the SDC Platinum database. 
In order to ensure the correctness of the data, the Lexis/Nexis database and company 
websites are also used. Most alliance announcements were cross-validated, and 
additional corrections are made based on a corporate history search that tracked name 
changes, mergers, acquisitions, and spin-offs involving each focal firm and its 
respective identified partners. This study includes the alliances when the status was 
completed, signed or extended, while status pending, letter of intent, and rumored 
alliances were excluded. In total, 15,276 alliances were retrieved, and only 1,792 
alliances are reported and valid between years 2000 and 2007. 
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Table 1 
Variables and measurement 
Control Variables Empirical Measurement 
Firm level:  
- Industry 
concentration  
- Relative size 
 
 
- A natural log of a firm’s total assets relative to industry’s assets (t) 
- A natural log of a firm’s total sales relative to industry’s assets (t) 
Portfolio level:  
- Functional learning  
- Portfolio size 
- Partner’s social status  
- Multi-partner alliance  
- Prior partnerships 
- Nation of participants  
- Location  
- Joint ventures  
- Ownership 
 
- Scope of alliance activities (t) 
- Total number of a firm’s alliances relative to total assets (t) 
- Social-status of partners toward a focal firm (t) 
- Average number of partners involved in each alliance (t) 
- Sequential partnership with a particular partner (t-5 → t-1) 
- Percentage of foreign partners of a firm’s alliance portfolio (t) 
- Proportion of alliances are operated relative to domestic ones (t) 
- Proportion of equity-based alliance relative to total portfolio (t) 
- Equity contribution made by a focal firm for the entire portfolio (t) 
Industry level:  
- Popularity of 
alliances 
- Market uncertainty  
- Year 
 
- A firm’s alliance portfolio relative to total number of alliances in 
the industry (t) 
- Volatility of net sales of a firm relative to the industry (t) 
- A dummy variable for each year 
Independent variables 
- Domain learning 
 
- Similarity between a firm’s industry with the formed alliance (t) 
Moderating variables 
- Interdependencies 
 
- Industry’s input-output exchange between a firm and partners (t) 
Dependent variables 
- Market performance  
 
- Market value relative to the base year (2000) (t+1) 
 
 
For each alliance, this study retrieved the information related to the date of 
announcement, pre-specified duration or termination date (most were unavailable), 
number of participating partners, partners’ names, public status and countries of origin, 
whether the alliance is a joint venture (JV), amount of equity contribution (if it is a JV), 
classification of agreement (R&D, sales, licensing, marketing and so on). This study 
also extracted firm-specific data, such as historical SIC code, total assets, total sales, 
and price-close monthly of the stock price from the COMPUSTAT database for the 
years 1999 to 2007.  
By regarding firm-year as the operational unit of analysis, this study pooled the 
data on 1,792 alliances across all alliances in each focal firm’s portfolio in a given year, 
producing 453 firm-year observations. This sample excluded pre-2000 records, which 
were eliminated because of the time frame setting and the lagging of a control variable 
(firm uncertainty) by one year relative to the dependent variable. A focal firm 
participated in 3.956 alliances on average during the time frame of the study, and 
engaged with 1.275 partners. The biggest alliance portfolio was managed by Microsoft 
(212 alliances), followed by IBM (194 alliances) and Hewlett Packard (82 alliances). 
There are 235 firms (51.88%) belonging to high velocity industries, in which computer 
software dominated (110 firms, 24.28%), followed by semiconductors (57 firms, 
12.58%), personal computers (56 firms, 12.36%), cosmetics (11 firms, 2.43%), toys and 
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games (seven firms, 1.55%), and athletic footwear (three firms, 0.66%). On average, a 
focal firm had $16,937 million in assets and had $21,095 million in sales.  
The correlation matrix also indicates that the results provide validation for the 
proposed hypotheses, and thus domain learning has a positive correlation with firm 
performance. Moreover, interdependency has a significant and negative relationship 
with regard to a firm’s market performance.  
 
IV.  RESULTS 
 
This study tests the models using hierarchical regression (Table 2). As proposed by 
Hypothesis 1, domain learning has a positive relationship with the market performance 
of a focal firm. The results indicate that domain learning consistently and positively 
influences the market performance ( = 0.101, p = 0.006, M1;  = 0.101, p = 0.007, 
M2;  = 0.118, p = 0.001, M3), and thus supports H1. Hypothesis 2 posits that 
interdependencies moderate the positive relationship between domain learning and 
market performance, in which a firm appropriates greater market value when they are 
less dependent on their partners compared to any other condition. As expected, there is 
a significant moderating effect ( = -0.222, p = 0.011; ∆R2 = 0.006, ∆F = 6.230), and 
thus H2 is supported.  
Following the procedure of Aiken and West (1991), Figure 2 depicts these 
moderating effects on the relationship between domain learning in an alliance portfolio 
and market performance. The figure shows that, in general, configuring an alliance 
portfolio predominantly by the divergence mode produces better market performance 
than the convergence mode. As expected, less dependencies enable a focal firm to 
appropriate market performance greater than the average ( X = 0.350) compared to the 
condition when they are balance ( X = 0.150) and highly dependent ( X = -0.050) for 
the divergence learning mode. When a company composes its alliance portfolio by the 
convergence mode, high dependencies generates market performance that is far below 
the average ( X = -0.666). A focal firm with less dependency toward its partners in an 
alliance portfolio has roughly equal market performance for both convergence and 
divergence learning modes ( X = 0.366), while mutual dependency produces market 
performance slightly below the industry’s average ( X = -0.150). 
 
V.   DISCUSSION AND CONCLUSIONS 
 
The findings indicate that domain learning has a positive relationship with firm 
performance, in which the divergence learning mode generates higher returns than the 
convergence one. This is in line with the notion that participating in alliances in 
different domains could broaden a firm’s current networks (Baum et al., 2000; Gulati, 
1998), in order to better adapt in a changing environment (Hoffmann, 2007; Koza and 
Lewin, 1998) by exploring new knowledge and capabilities (Sarkar et al., 2009) and 
market opportunities (e.g., D’Aveni, 2004). Consequently, the market performance of a 
focal firm will increase. Further results indicate that the use of the convergence learning 
mode generates less firm performance, although it leverages existing resources and 
capabilities. The reason is that convergence learning increases the value-claiming 
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concerns between a focal firm and the alliance itself (Wang and Zajac, 2007). 
Specifically, the convergence learning mode creates overlapping business due to similar 
resource bases in the environment (i.e., input resources, technologies, and markets), and 
thus induces conflicts (Bleeke and Ernst, 1995) and coopetition (Brandenburger and 
Nalebuff, 1996; Park and Ungson, 2001). As a result, the divergence learning mode 
contributes to greater firm performance than the convergence mode. 
 
 
Table 2 
The effects of domain learning and moderators on market value 
  
Research variables Dependent Variable: Market Performance 
M0 M1 M2 M3 
Control variables 
Industry concentration      0.666***      0.683***      0.683***      0.680*** 
Relative size   0.020  0.006  0.006  0.004 
Functional learning  -0.002 -0.009 -0.008 -0.006 
Portfolio size   -0.178+ -0.132 -0.127 -0.130 
Multi-partner alliance   0.027  0.020  0.020  0.018 
Partner’s social status   0.039  0.026  0.026  0.019 
Prior partnership  -0.016 -0.023 -0.020 -0.020 
Nation of participants  -0.005 -0.008 -0.011 -0.006 
Location   0.046  0.045  0.044  0.040 
JV   0.079  0.113  0.116  0.096 
Ownership   -0.141+  -0.149+  -0.154+ -0.134 
Popularity of alliances      0.260**   0.224*   0.220*   0.215* 
Market uncertainty  0.000  0.044  0.047  0.040 
Year 1  0.016  0.005  0.005 -0.005 
Year 2   -0.068+ -0.062 -0.063 -0.064 
Year 3 -0.007 -0.011 -0.011 -0.008 
Year 4  0.013  0.012  0.012  0.006 
Year 5 -0.023 -0.012 -0.007 -0.011 
Year 6 -0.062 -0.040 -0.035 -0.041 
Year 7  -0.089* -0.074 -0.074 -0.070 
Main effects 
Domain learning     0.101**     0.101**    0.118*** 
Interdependencies   -0.070   0.195* 
Moderating effect 
Domain learning x Interdependencies     -0.222* 
 
R2 0.592 0.592   0.592  0.599 
∆R2  0.007   0.007  0.006 
∆F    30.926 7.604   3.842  6.230 
p 0.000 0.006   0.022  0.013 
Note: 

represents p < .10, * represents p < 0.05; ** represents p < 0.01, *** represents p < .001 
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Figure 2 
The moderating effects of interdependencies 
 
 
Further, this study demonstrates that less dependent parties generate better 
market performance than balance or highly dependent ones, as having greater 
bargaining power facilitates their ability to appropriate higher private benefits (Dyer et 
al., 2008). Interestingly, this study also indicates that less dependent parties generate 
similar levels of market performance when they predominantly compose their alliance 
by using the convergence learning mode. Even though convergence exposes firms to 
the dangers of imitation (e.g., Ahuja, 2000; Westphal and Zajac, 1997) or increased 
competition (e.g., Khanna et al., 1998; Park and Ungson, 2001), but stronger partners 
can appropriate more private benefits due to their lower levels of dependence. The 
industry relatedness toward an alliance portfolio enables the focal firm to assess and 
negotiate with partners for greater shared private benefits (Coff, 1999), which is 
contingent upon importance of the resources contributed. Resource dependence theory 
posits that the more critical the resources that are contributed, the greater the bargaining 
power available to appropriate higher private benefits prior to alliance formation 
(Pfeffer and Salancik, 1978). For example, Dyer (1996) reports that Toyota generates 
greater private benefits than its suppliers, which are within- domain, due to its 
bargaining power. As a result, a less dependent firm could generate higher firm 
performance.  
In contrast, a firm with high dependency appropriates smaller private benefits 
due to the unavailability of alternative sources (e.g., Brass, 1984; Kumar et al., 1998) or 
the magnitude of exchange (e.g., Burt, 1982; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), forcing it 
to accept an unfavorable exchange arrangement. This study reveals that employing the 
divergence learning mode in an alliance portfolio enables a highly dependent firm to 
access alternative resources and manages the magnitude of exchange. Consequently, a 
highly dependent firm could have higher market performance when it employs the 
divergence rather than convergence learning mode in its alliance portfolio. This finding 
is consistent with the report of Kim et al. (2004) that weaker members of keiretsu have 
better firm performance when they broaden their business spectrum. In both situations, 
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lesser or higher dependency, competition rather than cooperation will be facilitated 
(Khanna et al., 1998) and value-claiming concerns are heightened (Wang and Zajac, 
2007). Differing from that, balance dependence refers to equal power between a focal 
firm and its partners in terms of economic exchange (Burt, 1982; Casciaro and 
Piskorski, 2005). Since the focus is on collaboratively creating value (Khanna et al., 
1998), they thus need to share the benefits generated in the alliance equally. The 
findings indicate that the market performance for a balance dependence condition is in 
between that for the condition of less and high dependence, which reflects the shared 
relational rents (Lavie, 2006).  
The above findings have important implications for alliance managers. First, 
configuring an alliance portfolio which is divergent from existing business generates 
greater market performance than a convergent one. This implies that firms should 
actively increase their business sphere to gather new opportunities and build new 
competencies (Koza and Lewin, 1998), and at the same time increase their 
competitiveness by protecting their business core, out maneuver weaker rivals, and 
prepare for future revenue sources (D’Aveni, 2004). Second, this study shows that 
composing an alliance portfolio in which a focal firm has less dependency toward their 
partners is a necessary condition to appropriate greater private benefits (i.e., increased 
firm performance). Although mutual dependence is conducive to engender trust and 
intensify knowledge sharing among partners, it is better for a focal firm to have 
partnerships with parties that are heavily dependent on a focal firm to appropriate 
greater value (Dyer et al., 2008). Moreover, for firms with high dependencies toward 
their partners, configuring an alliance portfolio which is divergent from their core 
business could mitigate the negative effect of their dependencies compared to the use of 
the convergence mode.  
Besides these managerial implications, this study has several theoretical 
implications. First, this study extends the organizational learning literature by 
introducing the concept of domain learning and the convergence/divergence learning 
modes. Even though many extensions have been made following the concept of 
exploitation/exploration in March (1991), the issue of alliances which converge or 
diverge from the focal firm’s domain is relatively little explored, particularly in the 
context of an alliance portfolio. Second, this study also empirically tests the conditions 
that could leverage the distribution of private benefits (Dyer et al., 2008) or the inbound 
spillover rent of an alliance portfolio (Lavie, 2006) by extending the logic of RBV. 
Third, this study extends the resource dependence theory literature (Pfeffer and 
Salancik, 1978), which is rich in theoretical discussion but relatively less empirically 
tested (Pfeffer and Salancik, 2003). Finally, this study also answers the call of Wassmer 
(2010) to expand the literature related to alliance portfolios and focal firm performance. 
Despite some compelling arguments, this study has several inherent limitations. 
First, this study mainly discusses the convergence/divergence issue from the focal 
firm’s perspective. By investigating the convergence/divergence issue from a dyadic 
perspective, future studies could address the issues of rent distribution, and private and 
common benefits between a focal firm and its partners (e.g., Dyer et al., 2008; Wang 
and Zajac, 2007). Second, this study mainly examines the domain learning simply 
whether the differences exist between a firm’s business and alliances. Future studies 
could further examine whether the alliance is part of a firm’s strategy to orchestrating 
its network resources vertically or horizontally (e.g., Gulati, 1998; Villalonga and 
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McGahan, 2005). Third, this study operationalizes interdependencies from the industry 
level (Burt, 1982, 1983; Casciaro and Piskorski, 2005), which might not represent the 
true I/O exchange between a focal firm and their partners. Approaching 
interdependencies from the corporate or business unit level could overcome this 
limitation. Fourth, even though this study has controlled the temporal effects, it does 
not emphasize how the co-evolution of an alliance portfolio (Hoffmann, 2007) relates 
to firm performance. Finally, this study does not consider the network resources which 
are embedded in an alliance portfolio, and integrating the network perspective (e.g., 
Ahuja, 2000; Koka and Prescott, 2008) could complement the results of this study.  
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